Great expectations: Working conditions since the end of apartheid by Pons-Vignon, Nicolas & Anseeuw, Ward
Great Expectations: 
Working Conditions since the End of Apartheid
 
Nicolas Pons-Vignon
Ward Anseeuw  
The Regulatory Environment 
and its Impact on the Nature 
and Level of Economic 
Growth and Development in 
South Africa
CONFERENCE 2008
  School of Economics
University of Cape Town
Employment Promotion Programme
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Great Expectations: Working Conditions since the End of Apartheid 
 
 
 
 
Nicolas Pons-Vignon (CSID, University of the Witwatersrand) 
Ward Anseeuw (CIRAD / University of Pretoria) 
 
Paper prepared for the 2008 DPRU conference 
 
 
 
 
A wave of xenophobic attacks targeting African immigrants in South Africa has shocked 
the world in April and May 2008. Leaving 62 people dead and thousands injured, it has 
incited hundreds of thousands to leave their homes and sometimes the country. Most 
political parties have condemned these attacks, although many rioters attacking 
foreigners were heard chanting Umshini wami (“Give me my machine gun”), which 
Jacob Zuma used to sing in 2007 before entering the Johannesburg court where he was 
being trialled (he was subsequently acquitted). Mr. Zuma, who registered a landslide 
victory over Thabo Mbeki to become President of the African National Congress (ANC) 
at its Polokwane Congress in December 2007, is widely seen as cristallising the hopes of 
the many South Africans who feel that they have not been able to reap the benefits they 
expected from the end of the apartheid regime in 1994. While it is unlikely that the 
attacks have been plotted by any organised political organisation, they convey a strong 
message which should not be ignored: there is a growing disenchantment with the “New” 
South Africa and it would be foolish not to recognise it.  
 
In a country where inequality is still higher than anywhere else in the world, it is hardly 
surprising that demands for improved living conditions are making themselves heard. 
What is worrying is that they are expressed with increasing violence while debates are 
confined within the ruling tripartite Alliance. The general elections planned for April-
May 2009 carry a sense of immense (if vague) hope and apprehension. This paper will 
attempt to shed light on the political economy of South Africa by focusing on an 
essential, yet often overlooked, cause for frustration among the majority of South 
Africans, namely their inability to access satisfactory jobs since 1994. The persistence of 
high uneployment is an essential part of this phenomenon; it is discussed in the 
conclusion of the paper but it is not its main focus. Rather, we look at the evolution of 
working conditions and argue that, while important changes have taken place, 
exploitation and poor working relations have all but disappeared. This could go a long 
way in explaining the frustration of the citizens last African country to have been freed 
from White political rule. 
 
In the first section, we emphasize the great expectations that were associated with the end 
of the apartheid workplace regime and the substantial revamping of labour law. In the 
following three sections, we look at the changes that have taken place in three selected 
sectors: mining, forestry and agriculture. Our perspective is firmly rooted in a reliance on 
case studies as opposed to abstract generalisations derived from large datasets, 
notwithstanding the latter’s value when they are rooted in a qualitative understanding of 
their object – and when the data is reliable. The sectoral diversity of legal regimes, 
institutional frameworks and economic conditions under apartheid further support our 
decision to analyse the evolution of working conditions in three sectors of the South 
African economy: mining, forestry and agriculture. Chosen for their historical and 
economic importance in South Africa (they represented 15% of the working population 
and 17.7% of GDP in 2005), these sectors were characterised by violent labour relations 
during apartheid and have experienced rapid (albeit multi-faceted) casualisation of labour 
thereafter. They present varying degrees of unionisation and linkage to international 
capitalism. Mining is an industrial sector that is deeply integrated with the global 
economy, with historically powerful unions. Forestry, a semi-industrial sector integrated 
into a number of local and global value chains, has seen its rate of unionisation collapse 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The situation of agriculture is quite different: it remains 
a conservative sector with paternalistic labour relations and weak unions, although its 
production, a portion of which is exported, is economically very significant. In the last 
section, we conclude by highlighting that the casualisation of working conditions in 
South Africa has triggered a crisis of reproduction which reveals the striking (and 
probably unsustainable) insufficiency of the transformation of the country’s economy. 
 
 
Great expectations: Into the Post-Apartheid Workplace Regime 
 
Social relations of production in contemporary South Africa have been heavily shaped by 
a violent history. Wage labour regimes have been remodelled by continuous social and 
political conflicts experienced in the country since the late 19th century. As noted by 
Makgetla (2006), the apartheid regime (and before this the British and South African 
colonial regimes) intentionally weakened the position of Blacks both as capitalists and as 
labourers by maintaining a situation of structural under-unemployment. This was aimed 
at protecting the socio-economic position of all Whites (notably the poor and least 
educated) while providing the capitalists with a cheap and tractable Black workforce, 
drawn from an impoverished “reserve army of labour”, ready to accept whatever work 
was on offer1 
 
At the heart of the apartheid political regime lay racially segregated and highly unequal 
labour rights. Beyond employment opportunities, the panoply of rights that white workers 
benefited from (union rights, social security, medical insurance, unemployment fund, 
access to labour courts, and so on) contrasted with the State’s efforts to weaken African 
workers, whether by subverting their organisations or by direct attacks2. White power 
was such that the permanent and often violent assertion of racial domination blurred the 
lines between productive tasks and personal services. At a “mixed” workplace, like the 
Highveld steel factory studied by Karl Von Holdt (2003), a black worker always had to 
be at the service of a white worker, whether the latter was his superior or not. Von Holdt 
shows how this blurring of racial and technical hierarchies, on top of being inefficient, 
generated a humiliation and a frustration that played a decisive role in the emergence of 
unions. The professional status of Blacks relegated them to the least qualified, most 
gruelling tasks for which they received miserly wages; their status did not allow them to 
contest unfair practices or dismissal, deprived them of any indirect wage such as pension 
or insurance, and of all potential for professional advancement. If employers’ practices 
allowed it, only the few Blacks who were in formal employment (from which all 
temporary workers were excluded) had the capacity to bargain for improved working 
conditions.3 
 
Apartheid generated individual workplace resistance from its outset, but working 
conditions only started improving in the wake of the violent strikes of 1973 in Durban. 
They were followed by increasingly structured union contestation which pushed the 
government to adopt the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1979 and to recognise black 
workers’ unions. New rights sparked the extension of conflict in the workplace and 
beyond, marking a turn in South African history. The increase of power of black unions 
drastically modified the status of wage labour and played a decisive role in the political 
turmoil that brought about the end of apartheid. In 1994, after the first democratic 
elections, a tripartite alliance between the African National Congress (ANC), the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU4) took power, bringing hope for better living and working conditions to the 
majority of South Africans. In 1995, one year after apartheid officially ended, the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA) restructured the relationships between employers and employees. 
Two years later, in 1997, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) provided a 
clear and inclusive definition of an employee, which covered all workers (except the self-
employed) and strictly regulated working conditions (45 working hours per week, 21 
days of leave per year, sick leave entitlement, etc.). While some of the regulations 
retained in the BCEA concern all sectors (unemployment insurance, retrenchment funds, 
etc.), a number of social protection measures (pension funds and different types of 
insurance) depend on negotiated agreements within each business or branch. It is for this 
reason that the BCEA provides a mechanism, called sectoral determination, allowing the 
Minister of Labour to intervene to define the minimum remuneration and working 
conditions in a given sector if workers are insufficiently unionised to negotiate with their 
employers.5  
 
The legal design of the post-apartheid labour regime reveals its (intended) collaborative 
nature and bears a striking resemblance to the Northern-European model of industrial 
relations. The latter’s appeal to COSATU and to the liberation movement at large reflects 
the popular rejection of what Von Holdt calls the “apartheid workplace regime”6 and 
signals a will to entrench the social gains obtained during the twenty years that preceded 
the first democratic elections. It is at odds with the market-oriented model promoted by 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who followed 
closely the ANC and the South African transition and sought to influence them7. These 
efforts were however not vain in other areas: macro economic policy, after an initial 
phase of fiscal largesse (the Reconstruction and Development Programme) aimed at 
addressing some of the structural inequalities inherited from apartheid, has been very 
prudent since 1996, both in its fiscal (South Africa ran an 11 billion Rand budget surplus 
in 2007) and monetary components. The violence associated with recent xenophobic 
outbursts draws attention to the fact that the social and economic expectations of many 
poor South Africans have often not been fulfilled. While one cannot ignore the progress 
made with the adoption of a very progressive Constitution and subsequent legislation, 
which enhanced the protection of civil, economic and social rights, several dynamics 
have constrained the awaited improvements of working and living conditions. We will 
explore them selectively, starting with the sector which has been the engine of South 
Africa’s economic development since the 19th century: mining. 
 
 
 
Mining Affected by Liberalisation and Subcontracting  
 
The mining sector has played a central role in South African history. It was for many 
years one of the nation’s primary employers and it has deeply shaped social relations of 
production8. The capitalisation required to enable extraction led to a concentration of 
capital among several large companies, which structured the whole economy. As such, 
mining development has led to the conditions of “petty-bourgeois production” through 
corporate mergers which concentrated ownership in progressively fewer hands9. Since 
the beginning of the 20th century, in the years following the discovery of diamonds in 
Kimberley in 1867 and of gold in Johannesburg in 1886, the South African economy has 
been organised around a “minerals-energy complex” (MEC), a term coined by Fine and 
Rustomjee in their landmark study of 199610. In order to supply this sector with an 
abundant and cheap workforce, specific social relations of production as well as spatial 
configurations were developed. The division of labour and tasks was strongly related to 
race, as illustrated by the separation between white ‘miners’ (allowed to work with 
explosives) and black ‘mineworkers’ (confined to basic tasks such as hand-digging or 
excavating) – a practice going back to the early 1920s11. This organisation of production 
was complemented by a system based on the employment of migrant workers travelling 
from territories reserved for non-Whites (the Bantustans) and neighbouring countries 
(Lesotho and Swaziland, but also Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique)12. This spatial 
structure was integral to the apartheid legal framework13 and persisted until 199414. 
 
Since the 1970s, the mining sector has become increasingly dependent on South African 
workers as a result of the partial loss of control over foreign labourers (following the 
independence of several southern African countries) and of the increase of local labour 
demand, which has led to an increase in wages (+320% between 1980 and 1985) in order 
to compete against other labour-intensive sectors15. Combined with the rising value of 
gold and the growing power of unions since the early 1980s16, this situation favoured the 
emergence of far-reaching demands, which led to sectoral agreements on the distribution 
of value added and working conditions. In addition to higher salaries compared to other 
sectors, mine workers generally benefited from well-defined, full-time, indefinite 
duration contracts. Indirect salaries and social protection were also important, partially 
protecting mine workers against the risks of unemployment, illness, disability or 
dismissal. Labour law covering issues such as working hours or sick leave was respected 
and health and safety regulations were relatively well abidden by. Mineworkers often 
benefited from additional advantages (pension funds, multiple forms of insurance, living 
and food allowances)17. Improvements in working conditions began to be reversed 
following the restructuring of the sector initiated after the major strike of 1987 and the 
liberalisation process of the 1990s. The concomitant decrease in international mineral 
prices meant that mines struggled to cover their labour costs, which had risen from 25 % 
to over 50% of overall production costs, initially triggering a substitution of labour with 
capital18. The South African mining workforce decreased from 750 000 in 1990 to 402 
000 in 199919. Moreover, since the 1990s, the sector has witnessed the emergence of 
companies adopting new organisational models and outsourcing the workforce en masse. 
Facilitated by the liberalisation of the economy, these trends have deeply impacted the 
working conditions of mine workers. 
 
First, liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State following the end of apartheid were 
accompanied by a political desire to undermine the power of oligopolies in the mining 
sector. Besides the many larger South African companies and conglomerates moving 
abroad or registering offshore20, the opening of markets has allowed the emergence of 
new, medium-sized, often foreign-owned mining enterprises which generally benefit 
from temporary licenses for mines whose rights they rent from large South African 
mining companies. In addition, since 1998, a programme aimed at increasing investment, 
business creation and employment has promoted small-scale, mainly Black-run mining 
activities, often on agricultural land and sometimes in the former Bantustans. Such 
businesses have rapidly developed and, although their production is difficult to quantify, 
Anseeuw estimated in a study conducted in 2000 that workers employed by these new 
companies represented 24% of the mining workforce21. All these new companies are 
investing either small or impermanent capital in generally temporary mining activities 
and their profitability depends on a considerable reorganisation of labour. As such, 
productivity gains are generally realised thanks to a reduction in production costs 
achieved through the deterioration of working and living conditions of labourers. 
 
Second, outsourcing of labour has developed rapidly22; initially concerning so-called side 
or secondary activities such as catering, accommodation, and social services, outsourcing 
increasingly impacts core productive activities. Two different types of subcontracting 
have been observed in the mining sector23. The first can be considered to be “formal”: 
contractors are legally registered companies that allocate their workers to different 
companies; a labour surplus in one mine can be absorbed by another. In this case, 
subcontracting is not a means to circumvent labour laws or branch agreements, nor is it 
geared to prevent union organising, but it aims to create a more flexible work 
organisation. Indeed, mining companies have imposed on their formal contractors, often 
due to union pressure, work conditions more or less comparable to their own. However, 
subcontracting often goes hand in hand with a deterioration of working conditions. This 
sort of subcontracting can be called “informal”. Workers employed by these contractors 
are typically offered less advantageous working conditions. Such practices are observed 
in all types of mining companies, who use them to evade certain legislative requirements 
and limit union action. In these cases, subcontracting becomes mainly a means to change 
working conditions without having to negotiate with workers or their unions. Though 
little recent data is available, Crush noted that in 1997, 5% of coal mine workers worked 
on subcontracts24, while in 1999 Streek estimated that the rate of workers on subcontracts 
in the mining industry was in general above 30% (50% of whom were foreigners)25. 
Anseeuw, in his study conducted in 2000, estimated that 12% of workers were 
“informally” subcontracted26. 
 
Except for formal subcontracting, recent processes associated with the liberalisation of 
the mining sector, i.e. new mining enterprises and informal subcontracting, have thus led 
to a deterioration of working conditions. These new models are characterised by low 
investment and intense labour exploitation: lower production costs are achieved through 
the deterioration of labour situations, which become very precarious, even illegal. When 
they are declared, employees are often hired on temporary (sometimes daily) contracts. 
This change goes hand in hand with a less advantageous employment status and 
decreased security, an important reduction in direct (which are neither indexed nor 
negotiated) and indirect wages, as well as with a degradation of physical working 
conditions (the 45-hour work week is often not respected). Compared to the initial 
conditions of large mining companies, Anseeuw estimates that the average decrease in 
direct salaries is 65% on average, for increased working hours and more difficult and 
strenuous tasks27. These workers do not have unemployment (or any other) insurance or 
pension fund and their temporary status does not include holidays or sick leave. In 
addition, employment often depends on available work and on actual profits: mine 
workers are forced to assume part of the business risk of the company. This model of 
organisation allows employers to access a flexible, cheap and tractable workforce, which 
in addition is not in a position to bargain for improvements: labour insecurity discourages 
mineworkers from joining a union or from attempting to negotiate better working 
conditions. The employees of temporary mine exploitations, of abroad/offshore based 
companies or of the majority of the subcontracted activities are thus unlikely to ever 
benefit from the current high mineral prices linked to high demand from India, China and 
Eastern Europe. The casualisation of work observed in South African mines finds its 
equivalent in many countries confronted with globalisation, but liberalisation also has, as 
will be demonstrated, more specific consequences in less integrated and less unionised 
sectors. 
 
 
South African Forestry in Crisis: A Worst-Practice of Outsourcing? 
 
The South African timber industry developed from the beginning of the 20th century and 
was the driving force behind the emergence of numerous tree plantations28. Contrary to 
central Africa, southern Africa has a modest area under natural forest cover: in 1999, 
forests represented approximately 0.3% of the South African territory29. Plantations are 
constituted of imported species, mainly pine and eucalyptus, which are replanted shortly 
after felling. Like many South African industries, the timber industry was first at the 
service of the minerals-energy complex; until the 1960s, demand for timber mostly came 
from the mining sector, as well as from construction30. The State played a direct role in 
the establishment of plantations to overcome the risks inherent in this type of investment, 
where the return takes many years to be realised. From the 1960s onwards, the State 
supported the growth of the pulp and paper industry through a variety of export subsidies 
and credit facilities, intended in particular for two private companies which have since 
become global players: Sappi and Mondi, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Group. 
Although the expansion of South African plantations was slightly curbed after 1972 in 
order to regulate their impact on river flows, the timber industry represented in 2003 a 
value added of 1.35 billion euros, or 1% of South Africa’s GDP, and employed more than 
170 000 people, 60 000 of which in forestry31.. But, since the end of the 1980s, the sector 
has been experiencing a crisis which it struggles to overcome and which is linked – as we 
will see – to the outsourcing of forestry operations. 
 
The contracting of forestry operations began in the late 1980s, at the time when urban 
unrest against the apartheid regime reached rural areas and forestry workers, in large part 
through the activism of unionised factory (paper- and sawmills) workers (Webster, 1999, 
and author interviews). Until 2000, large forestry companies insisted that they relied on 
contractors to improve productivity, alleging that entrepreneurs should be more 
productive than managers (for an ingenuous presentation of this argument, see Morkel, 
2000). Forestry companies outsourced their entire operations in a few years’ time, 
encouraging their foresters – all Whites – to set themselves up as contractors. The first to 
outsource were the pulp and paper giants, Sappi and Mondi, whose activities were 
traditionally integrated vertically “from stump to mill” and who are referred to as 
growers-producers (GPs). Production of timber was in effect subsidised by that of pulp 
and paper, which have a much higher market value. By contracting the most labour-
intensive part of their activities, the GPs effectively transferred risks to their contractors, 
paying them for actual production only without providing them with any technical 
assistance32. 
 
Forestry, a fortiori when deprived of the mutualisation of risks with downstream 
transformation industries, is a risky activity, marred by low timber prices, very small 
margins and vulnerability to weather variations (mostly impacting debarking and 
transportation). The organisation of production in the sector is draconian and profits 
depend on strict controls of production and costs. But outsourcing was accompanied by 
an aggressive strategy by the GPs to reduce the remuneration of contractors. They 
exacerbated a “race to the bottom” price competition and prevented contractors from 
collectively negotiating annual remuneration increases, by threatening them individually 
not to award them a contract33. There are no available figures to determine the evolution 
of the remuneration of contractors, but it is likely that it increased on average less quickly 
than inflation since the beginning of the 1990s, reducing real income considerably. A 
study conducted in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa’s main forestry area along with 
Mpumalanga, estimated the bankruptcy rate of contractors to be more than 40% in 
200434. It is emphasised in this study that ‘although contracting is in theory about a 
commercial relationship based on provision of services, in reality there is such a power 
imbalance between the GPs and the contractors, such that it better resembles an 
employment relationship’ (p.14). 
 
The insistence of forestry companies to remunerate their contractors as little as possible 
contributed to the development of subcontracting, sometimes chain subcontracting (i.e.e 
contracting out by contractors), most often outside any formal rules. These new 
entrepreneurs are usually Blacks who work for white contractors and employ unskilled 
workers, often women and illegal migrants, living near their place of residence. This 
evolution is paradoxically seen as progressive from the point of view of the national 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy, which supports the 
creation of small Black-owned businesses as part of a development and poverty reduction 
strategy. But most of these entrepreneurs struggle to keep their businesses afloat; 
reimbursing debts accumulated to finance the business is often the main motivation to 
continue until bankruptcy. Moreover, the difficulties they experience to insure the 
reproduction of their means of production often leads to the suffocation of the household 
income. Entrepreneurs tend to “divert” resources from the family budget (school fees, 
food) to pay workers or fix equipment, which makes them more akin to the African petty 
commodity producers described by Bernstein (2003) than to promising capitalists. In his 
research, Pons-Vignon has documented numerous cases where small contractors 
experienced a squeeze as they exhausted domestic resources (reproduction as labour) in 
order to keep their business afloat (reproduction as capital). The forestry industry has thus 
greatly suffered from outsourcing: the bankruptcy of many foresters turned contractors 
has deprived the sector of qualified professionals; productivity and production have 
declined and the number of criminal acts on plantations (arson, timber theft, etc.) are on 
the rise35. 
 
This crisis has profoundly affected the forestry workforce, leading to a rapid casualisation 
of working conditions. The risk that forestry companies are unloading onto their 
contractors is in large part assumed by the workers themselves, who are subject to task 
work (i.e. they are paid upon completion of a set task rather than of a work day). This 
practice, common in forestry, has become a means of intolerable exploitation with 
outsourcing: the task is indexed on the productivity necessary to achieve the production 
stipulated in the contract between the forestry company and the contractor, rather than on 
the physical capacity of workers. Many of them are paid between 300 and 500 rands per 
month for hard and often dangerous labour (author research). The tasks demanded are 
often beyond workers’ abilities, they are usually not given adequate training and lack 
experience and proper equipment. Their resulting inability to perform the required task 
allows contractors to underpay them and reduce costs. A frequently observed mechanism 
to transfer production risks to workers is the refusal to adapt tasks to changing weather 
conditions, a determining factor notably for debarking, since dry bark is very hard to tear. 
The daily “task race” pushes workers to take risks, further increasing the danger 
associated with forestry work. Employers are however very reluctant to recognise work-
related injuries; they often do not pay their insurance contributions and their principal 
companies threaten not to renew their contract if the number of reported accidents 
increases. Living conditions in forestry compounds have also deteriorated largely due to 
widespread overpopulation in these “worker villages”, isolated in the middle of 
plantations, and to the withdrawal of GPs from their direct management. Compound 
management has indeed also been outsourced, with as little supervision as other forestry 
activities; cases of workers living in crowded tents are frequent in Mpumalanga (author 
research). 
 
In rural areas, until the 1990s, forestry workers formed a sort of proleterarian elite when 
compared to workers in agriculture, because they were employed by large companies 
who conceded a number of social advantages, often as a resuly of action by workers in 
transformation industries. Due to the impact of outsourcing, forestry has come to be seen 
as a last resort and many prefer to work in sugar cane or citrus plantations, where 
conditions are reputed to be very difficult. All indirect incomes have been cut from 
forestry workers’ wages and the duration of contracts, sometimes based on the 
contractors’ (generally one year), has often been shortened to three months. More and 
more women and foreigners, often illegal Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, or Swazis, 
replace the “traditional” male South African workers who made up the majority of the 
labour force during the era of vertical integration. 
 
Although union mobilisation played a decisive role in the improvement of working 
conditions in the forestry sector in the 1980s, its efficiency was linked to an alliance with 
factory workers, for example in sawmills, who were better organised than plantation 
workers. The contracting out of forestry operations separated the two groups of workers, 
and the separation was entrenched in the mid-1990s with COSATU’s creation of 
SAAPAWU (South African Agricultural, Plantations and Allied Workers Union), which 
organised agricultural workers together with their counterparts in forestry, who were 
previously organised by PPWAWU (Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union). 
Whatever the motives behind the creation of SAAPAWU, regrouping two of the weakest 
categories of workers (forestry and agriculture) in conditions of growing casualisation 
proved to be impossible and the union soon collapsed. Membership declined and 
negotiations with forestry employers were difficult, since the latter, from a handful of 
GPs, were now made up of hundreds of contractors. Numerous micro unions, often with 
questionable practices, appeared in areas left uncovered by COSATU-affiliated unions 
(author research). In 2004, the failure of SAAPAWU was made apparent by its merger 
into FAWU (Food and Allied Workers Union), which until present has not succeeded in 
halting the collapse of unions in forestry. The failure of unions to protect forestry workers 
is obvious, and the causes are at least partially found in their division, which happened at 
the same time as a far-reaching structural change in the organisation in the industry was 
taking place. 
 
The publication, in March 2006, of a forestry sectoral determination36 demonstrates the 
government’s recognition of the inability of unions to represent and defend forestry 
workers. The Minister prohibited that task payment be applied to the entire wage of 
forestry workers, declaring that the minimum wage was to be given in full and that he 
could not “tolerate employer’s argument according to which task-based work without a 
guaranteed minimum wage ensures that ‘lazy’ workers do what is asked of them”37. 
However, one can doubt the impact that this ministerial determination will have in a 
sector where the deficiency of unions and the precariousness of workers render the 
reporting of violations unlikely, especially when labour inspectors are notoriously 
understaffed38. However, the fact that state intervention was necessary reflects the 
severity of the problems of working relations in rural areas, as further documented below. 
 
 
In the Agricultural Sector, a Failure to Secure Land and Labour 
 
In comparison with forestry and mining, the history of South African agricultural labour 
is found as much, if not more, in the pattern of land appropriation as it is in labour 
legislation. Indeed, colonial history and the expropriation of indigenous people, 
especially since the land laws of 1913 and 1936 (Native Land Acts), have shaped 
working and living conditions. 
 
After the migration of the Boers (the “Great Trek”) in the 19th century and the 
appropriation of much land by settlers, many non-Whites were confined to small, 
squattered and infertile pieces of land, often leaving them with the sole option to become 
sharecroppers on white farmland39. In addition, the laws of 1913 and 1936 attributed 
precisely 8% then 13% of South African land to non-Whites, who represented 
approximately 80% of the population. These laws confined Coloureds in reserves and 
Blacks in Bantustans, where land tenure was kept uncertain and agricultural practice was 
supposed to remain communal. Although these measures first served the objective of land 
appropriation by Whites, leading to the displacement of millions of non-Whites, they also 
aimed at suffocating the Black peasantry40. Subordinated and deprived of their own 
economic resources, these populations became a reserve army of labour for White 
agriculture and industries for which, as seen above, a system of migrant work from the 
reserves and the Bantustans was established. These laws also allowed Whites to evict 
Black workers living on their land and facilitated the hardening of labour conditions. 
Sharecropping agreements – considered to be generous towards Blacks – were questioned 
and gradually transformed into paid agricultural labour and, in Natal, into “labour 
tenants”, a system in which work was supplied in exchange for the right to live on the 
farm land41. 
 
By the end of apartheid, living conditions of farm workers (either paid workers or labour 
tenants) had deteriorated considerably: in addition to the 3.5 million Blacks that were 
expelled from their land between 1950 and 1980, about 1.4 million people, during the 
same period, and an additional 730 000 people in the last 10 years of apartheid were 
chased from White-owned land42. Furthermore, until 1994, farm workers did not have the 
right to organise themselves or to join a union. Their working conditions were less than 
mediocre: difficult tasks and workdays frequently in excess of 12 hours for extremely 
low wages, often paid in kind. The relationships between farm workers and owners were 
characterised by dependence and paternalism43: Not only was permission to reside on the 
farm dependent on work, making it liable to be revoked with loss of employment; 
workers were (and are sometimes still) also dependent on the farmer to provide 
necessities, often creating a cycle of indebtedness. 
 
After 1994, the LRA and BCEA provided legal protection to agricultural workers. Even 
though no minimum wage was set at the time, they provided a general framework for 
employment conditions with, inter alia, the regulation of working hours  and the 
abolition of child labour. Moreover, in order to transform the structure of land ownership 
in the country, as well as to ensure political, social and economic stability, the 
government launched a land reform programme. Besides land transfers, tenure reform 
aimed at securing land rights for non-Whites. To protect agricultural workers’ land rights, 
Parliament passed the Labour Tenants Act (LTA) in 1996 and the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act (ESTA) in 1997, which provided a legal framework for evictions. 
However, with the exception of people who have worked and lived for more than 20 
years on a farm, these laws do not protect workers’ residency rights; they nonetheless 
guarantee that a court would control evictions. Subsequently, in July 2003, minimum 
wages were set according to a sectoral determination: Depending on location, they range 
between 872 rands in rural areas and 950 rands in peri-urban areas44. 
 
Far from achieving their objectives, the new laws intended to protect farm workers are 
rarely implemented and have sometimes had a negative impact on the working and living 
conditions of farm workers. An increase in evictions has been observed since 1994 in 
reaction to the implementation of the LRA, ETA and ESTA laws and to the establishment 
of minimum wages. Nkuzi Development Association estimates that approximately 
930,000 farm workers have been evicted since 1994, a 13% increase compared to the ten 
years preceding the first democratic elections45. According to O’Keefe, citing a study by 
Social Surveys Africa conducted in 2005, there were 199,611 households evicted from 
their land compared to 164,185 households benefiting from land reform programmes 
between 1994 and 200446. Only 1% of these evictions was reported and conducted 
according to proper legal procedures. The majority of those evicted had worked and lived 
on the land for generations; not only did they lose their jobs but also their homes. 
According to Nkuzi, only 8% of the evicted found new work (and therefore new 
accommodation) as farm workers, 14% moved to the former Bantustans and reserves 
where access to over-crowded communal land is uncertain, 48% relocated to townships 
and 30% were reduced to illegal land occupation47. 
 
Regarding the working conditions, even if a union of farm workers, SAAPAWU, which 
was subsequently integrated with FAWU (see supra), developed since 1994 and claims to 
have 300,000 members (most of whom are employed in food processing industries or 
catering), it has not succeeded in improving labour conditions in the sector. 68% of farm 
workers live in extreme poverty: in 2004, one year after the implementation of minimum 
wages, the average monthly salary of farm workers was estimated at 529 rands for men 
and 332 rands for women48, while the South African Human Rights Commission even 
reported salaries of 60 rands per month49. Eleven to twelve hour working days (without 
compensation) are commonly found and child labour is far from having disappeared. The 
rules concerning health and safety are rarely respected and the living conditions of 
workers remain very insecure in the majority of cases: many are housed in shacks (often 
made of corrugated iron) without electricity, running water or sanitation. 
 
In addition, the above-mentioned measures implemented to protect workers rights 
increased tensions between farm owners and farm workers, exacerbating the atmosphere 
of mistrust and conflict50. In order to prevent workers form joining a union and to avoid 
having to abide by the LTA and ESTA laws (i.e. securing workers’ land rights), farm 
owners have made living conditions unbearable to force workers away: homes have been 
demolished, electricity and water cut off, etc. The new measures have also induced 
changes in practices and have accelerated the evolution of the social division of labour. In 
order to limit the number of workers, farm owners have mechanised their activities and 
have turned to less labour-intensive activities (such as game farms for tourism). The use 
of a seasonal and/or temporary workforce increasingly made up of foreign workers, 
mostly Zimbabwean and Mozambican (generally employed illegally), also becomes more 
and more frequent. These illegal workers are victims of abuse that is rarely reported or 
punished.  
 
Numerous cases of violence, including murder (besides the many farm workers killed 
since 1994, 1500 landowners and farmers have been murdered) have been reported, and 
are linked to the social demands of the landless and other rural poor, to growing 
inequality, to poor working and living conditions and to farm labour relations. Because of 
the link between agricultural work and access to land inherited from apartheid, working 
conditions determine (even more than in other sectors) the living and reproduction 
conditions of farm workers and their families. It is against this incredibly harsh 
background that workers’ brutality targeting White farmers should be interpreted, bearing 
in mind that union weakness forces them to act alone and outside of any political 
articulation. 
 
 
Unfulfilled Expectations and the Post-Apartheid Disenchantment 
 
South Africa’s transition has profoundly impacted workers, without improving their 
situation in a meaningful way; it has been accompanied by a casualisation of their status 
and conditions, as demonstrated in the three case studies presented in this article. The 
importance of this evolution cannot be underestimated in a country where violence in 
working relations was the day-to-day form of racial oppression. Although the advent of 
democracy met the political expectations of the majority, the protective labour law 
adopted by the new Government did not prevent, when it did not aggravate, the 
persistence of exploitation, deceiving the hopes of poor (i.e. most) South Africans. The 
roots of this disenchantment can be found, in the three sectors analysed, in specific 
dynamics that can be grouped in two main tendencies, also found across South African 
society and economy: economic liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State on the one 
hand; and the South African specificity of racial segregation on the other hand. 
 
Since 1996, although it did not have to implement any structural adjustment plan, South 
Africa has liberalised its economy and has greatly limited the role of the State, especially 
with regard to economic intervention51. South Africa’s economic actors have adapted in 
different ways to a post-apartheid situation characterised not only by a new socio-
political context, but also by an economic restructuring involving the end of active 
support from the State to selected “national champions” combined with international 
opening. The private sector responded with a substitution of labour with capital, the 
creation of temporary enterprises and, most of all, with massive outsourcing, which 
allowed it to reduce costs and to make working arrangements highly flexible. Businesses 
also anticipated a rise in labour costs and in workers’ rights generally – what some would 
call labour market rigidity. Yet, we observed a rapid casualisation of workers’ statuses as 
well as conditions through the increased use of temporary contracts, informal labour and 
task-based payment. In many sectors a movement towards the restoration of a tractable, 
un-unionised workforce is at work, which is continuously reducing, through means not 
always understood by workers (like task-based remuneration), the part of value added 
allocated to labour, who is forced to assume a growing part of risks. These tendencies are 
particularly present in the mining and forestry sectors, where labour conditions had 
improved during the years of union and political struggles preceding the end of apartheid. 
In addition, the “productive reorganisation” of these sectors was the only option proposed 
to reduce unemployment and poverty. 
 
This first dynamic and its implications bear a striking resemblance to the evolution of 
working conditions in other “globalised” economies and followed, as noted by numerous 
economists and sociologists, a reorganisation inspired by the “new spirit of capitalism”, 
which has been traced by Boltanski and Chiapello in the evolution of business school 
handbooks52. 
 
The case studies, however, reveal a liberalisation with a specifically South African 
flavour. Although international competition has certainly motivated, in some cases, 
productive reorganisation, South African employers were equally influenced, particularly 
in agriculture and forestry, by the fear of seeing yesterday’s subordinate workforce 
demanding and exercising new rights to redress past wrongs. The case studies presented 
here unambiguously indicate that outsourcing and casualisation have been reactions to 
this perceived threat and to fears that labour discipline would be impossible to implement 
in a “free” workplace regime. Other studies confirm them, including one conducted on 
the contracting out of cleaning services at Wits university by Bezuidenhout and Fakier53. 
It is also interesting to note that liberalisation and the withdrawal of the State were the 
exact opposite of segregationist policies, the main instruments of apartheid. This is one of 
the main sources of the popularity of liberalisation among South African elite, both Black 
and White: the apartheid leviathan must be abandoned through a liberal policy that limits 
State intervention. But the relevance of this hostile rhetoric towards the State can be 
questioned in a country where social and racial tensions are very high and where the 
transition has bypassed a transformation of the productive apparatus, social relations and 
income structure. The implementation of liberal policies further facilitates, in South 
Africa, the persistence of a racial and social hierarchy in the name of the supposed 
benefits of the free market. The political and economic orientations adopted and analysed 
here in the context of the evolution of labour conditions do not demonstrate any will or 
capacity for profound transformation. 
 
Differing from other countries, where crises have typically been periods characterised by 
a redefinition of wage relations, leading to the implementation of new relations of 
production, new management practices of the workforce as well as new forms of 
consumption,54 South Africa witnesses the emergence of new forms of employment that 
reflect a continuation of racial subordination, without reconfiguring the inherited 
apartheid wage relations. These new forms of employment, presenting more labour 
precariousness, facilitate the sidestepping of restructuring and limit the actual 
transformation of South African society. The observation of workplace politics highlights 
social conflicts, whose importance is essential to shed light on the country’s economic 
and political transformation (or lack thereof). It seems somewhat utopian to expect a 
restructuring of South African society on the basis of limited reforms. The sectors that 
have few unions (agriculture), or whose unions have lost their will or ability to fight, 
sometimes because of their proximity with political power, offer good examples: the 
simple declaration of measures supposed to protect workers’ rights had little effect but 
that of accelerating the deterioration of working and living conditions of the least 
protected. 
 
The casualisation of work is even more worrisome since it is accompanied by a 
withdrawal of the State and the end of the paternalism of apartheid. As Barchiesi 
remarks: 
Macroeconomic paradigms have greatly constrained the government’s 
ability to use state expenditures and social grants to address massive 
poverty and social inequality arising from the country’s deepening 
employment crisis. The ANC government has therefore opted for 
symbolic compensation by continuously praising wage labour as the 
cornerstone of social discipline and inclusion. In this way it has, ironically, 
operated in substantial continuity with Apartheid-era social policy 
discourse, which, moreover, and similarly to the post-1994 dispensation, 
praised community self-help and family support as alternatives to both 
unemployment and dependence on public spending.55 
 
Because of the historical weakness of social policy and of the persistence of mass 
unemployment (estimated at 23,1% for the 2nd quarter of 2008, a figure which would 
almost double if “discouraged” work seekers were included56), a strong family- and 
community-based solidarity subsists in South Africa. Most workers work to support their 
family; this points to another consequence, difficult to quantify but obviously dramatic, 
of labour casualisation. The ability of the employed to save money for their family has 
been drastically reduced, impacting an important number of (often invisible) dependents 
and unemployed who rely on this support to survive. For agricultural workers and their 
families, this even translates into the loss of access to land and housing. Another factor is 
the increase of the active population linked to the feminisation of the workforce57, and to 
the high number of foreigners in South Africa. Women and foreigners are replacing the 
men of the country, who can no longer provide for the needs of their family with reduced 
income from precarious jobs. The employment crisis – unemployment and casualisation – 
thus induces a general crisis of social reproduction. 
 
The workers described in this article are, in the full sense of the term, “working poor”. 
Their difficulties, shared by a large portion of the population, are not fully acknowledged 
by policy-makers, who at best address with “accompanying measures”. Improvements in 
working conditions are also often seen as secondary given the high level of 
unemployment and are silenced by a solemn call for necessary adaptation: work must 
become more flexible so that more jobs can be created. This economic strategy is, in the 
eyes of some, the only means envisaged to restructure and deracialise the South African 
economy and reflects the transition compromise struck between the ANC and the large 
South African conglomerates58. Thus, the development of Black small, medium and 
micro enterprises (SMMEs) through preferential contracting (BEE) is imposed like a 
dogma, as it is perceived to be a component of a necessary trajectory (the creation of a 
Black bourgeoisie), and a vehicle for the transformation of society; it has also, however, 
increased the flexibility and exploitation of the Black workforce. 
 
The improvements of working conditions obtained during the last years of apartheid, 
through the pressure of union battles against despotic, often violent, practices, were 
followed by a casualisation that has exposed workers to the “dull compulsions of 
economic forces” (in Marx’s terms). This faceless violence, presented as necessary, is 
one that labourers must impose on themselves. It appears, fourteen years after the end of 
apartheid, under which labour markets (and society) were segmented by law, that 
inequality and the belief in the progressiveness of unfettered markets have perpetuated a 
dual labour market, as was already highlighted by Hinks in 200359. This outcome is 
strikingly (and tragically) ironic: access to new, much awaited, political rights is 
concomitant to a collapse of the material means of actually using them! This labour crisis 
points to the essential and potentially destabilising contradiction of the economic policies 
that the South African government has followed since 1994, mixing economic liberalism 
and wilful redistribution. The Polokwane landslide in favour of Jacob Zuma (or possibly 
against Thabo Mbeki) and recent xenophobic violence undoubtedly indicate that this 
model of development is reaching its limits in terms of political tolerability. 
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